In the Second World War the normal market orientation of the British economy was replaced by a system of centralised control and economic planning. The key feature of this system was the process of physical planning operated by the central authorities through which they controlled the allocation and use of scarce resources such as labour, steel and capacity. In the official history volumes (which dominate the historiography), however, one central question evades the readerhow were these scarce resources allocated?' Page after page in volume after volume offers descriptive evidence of the decisions taken about resource allocation but far too often there is no analysis of how this was actually managed.
New Li2ht Throu2h Old Windows: A New Perspective On The British Economy In The Second World War
In the Second World War the normal market orientation of the British economy was replaced by a system of centralised control and economic planning. The key feature of this system was the process of physical planning operated by the central authorities through which they controlled the allocation and use of scarce resources such as labour, steel and capacity. In the official history volumes (which dominate the historiography), however, one central question evades the readerhow were these scarce resources allocated?' Page after page in volume after volume offers descriptive evidence of the decisions taken about resource allocation but far too often there is no analysis of how this was actually managed.
The reader is allowed to drown in a sea of information, rarely being told what were the real and potential problems faced in resource allocation, what moves were taken to overcome the inherent frictions, and whether or not those moves were successful.
I wish to contend that, given the institutional framework of the wartime administration, the central issue of the management of the British war economy was the potential and actual interdepartmental competition, its affect on resource allocation and the moves taken to counter it and promote cooperation. The strengths and weaknesses of the British wartime economy cannot be understood unless we know how resources were allocated and how the process of allocation evolved.
The distinguishing feature of any economic system is how it chooses to allocate resources. In a market economy allocation is achieved through the operation of , The two most important volumes in this series are: W.K. Hancock and M.M. Gowing, British War Economy (London and Nendeln 1975) and M.M. Postan, British War Production (London and Nendeln 1975) . the price mechanism. In Britain in the Second World War, however, the Churchill Government abandoned any pretence of a laissez-faire attitude and evolved a system for the central direction of the war economy. An attempt was made to manage the economy without using prices as a guideline. The major allocative decisions were reached not through the interplay of market forces but through the invisible, and not so invisible, hands of government bureaucracies.
Central government expenditure on defence, for example, increased from £254 million in 1938/9 to £5,100 million in 1944/5 and this was matched by an expansion in the size of the non-industrial civil service staffs in the five war related government departments from 53,000 in 1939 to 241,000 in 1944.
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Those government departments responsible for the armed forces and for supplying them with munitions came to dominate the economic system and they had priority with regards to scarce resources, such as steel and labour, within the economy. These resources were allocated by War Cabinet committees to which the departments made representations. All that stood between a department and the achievement of its desired allocation were the representations of other departments and thus the potential for departmental competition existed.
The allocation of resources to a department depended on the relative priority given by the War Cabinet to their production programme and the relative strength of that department compared to other departments, including the ability of each of the service departments (those directly responsible for the army, navy and air force, respectively the War Office, the Admiralty and the Air Ministry) to influence overall military strategy. In order to ensure that it did not lose out in the competition for scarce resources, a department had either to present a highly persuasive case to the central allocator or it had to find ways of demonstrating that the demands presented by other departments were weaker than its demands.
Thus, resource allocation was the result of military necessity, productive possibilities and bureaucratic friction. In such a system the relationship between different departments and, more importantly, the relationship between each different department and the bodies responsible for resource allocation will become the focal point of the system -these relationships will define power, distribution and efficiency in the economy.
In section I a simple game theoretic device will be used to show the potential problems faced by the central authorities; section 11 then sets out a formalised model of how the wartime British economy actually operated in terms of the process of physical planning; section III looks at how mechanisms that promoted cooperation evolved; the final section argues that there is still much to learn about the wartime economy and that the new approach suggested in this paper is a useful way of analyzing many of the important issues -that it is possible to bring new light through old windows.
I
In a centrally managed or administered economy in which most of the important resources are distributed by the central authorities the role of the price mechanism as an efficient carrier and conveyor of information becomes redundant. Instead, efficiency is crucially dependent upon the availability and processing of statistical, strategic and other technical information. Thus, the success of the system is decided by the flow and stock of non-price information (such as the alloy steel capacity of the country or the number of workers required to produce one heavy bomber).
In such a system, efficiency can only be ensured on two conditions: firstly, that all information is made available, at the minimum possible cost, to the apparatus that serves the central allocators; second, that the apparatus is an efficient information filtering service. The efficiency of the information filtering service will be defined by its ability to provide a comprehensive service, to coordinate its material and to render complex, quantitative issues meaningful through providing succinct reports to the decision-takers. These skills are important because if too little information is provided it is almost certain that a non-optimal decision will be made but, on the other hand, with too much information the path to the optimal outcome may become blurred in a thick fog of technical detail. If the bodies which decide on the nature of the different production and allocation programmes cannot evolve a cooperative strategy which ensures free and efficient information flows then it is likely that the system will be inefficient.
In order to show the tensions that could exist in such a system, and in particular to show the potential for departmental conflict, it is necessary to start with some simplifying assumptions (these will be relaxed later). It will initially be assumed that the information filtering process is in fact efficient and that the more information that is available the more efficient will be the system. In a wartime economy it is possible to add two motivational assumptions to this: first, everyone in the system has a common interest in maximising the output of the economy and therefore in achieving the most efficient allocation of resources in relation to the strategic needs (that is, they desire to win the war); second, each supply department has a strong belief in the importance of its own particular work (that is, it believes that the war can only be won if it maximises its output within the set strategic considerationsV 3 Here the path pioneered by W.A. Niskanen, Bureaucracy and Representative Government (Chicago and New York 1971) , is followed in that it is implicitly assumed that the bureaucrat has a utility function which she attempts to maximise. This utility function is strongly linked to the size of the departmental budget and competing for a particular resource. Each department has two options: it can reveal all the information it has available to the central allocator or it can choose to provide the central allocator with selective information (this would be designed to strengthen its case for the resource or, alternatively, not to weaken it). The dilemma faced by each department is illustrated in figure one which shows the four possible strategies that could be adopted. In a system in which only the first motivational assumption is applicable then the outcome would be a (both departments would reveal all the relevant information at their disposal to the central allocator), as there would be no reason to withhold information. This would be the best solution for the economy as a whole; a is the optimal outcome.
However, if both assumptions hold then the outcome will not be optimal. It is unlikely to be b or c either because the department that is selective, assuming that its selection does indeed make its case more favourable, will, usually, be in a stronger position than the department that is not selective. Thus, the most likely outcome, indeed the only outcome in a system where both motivational hence the bureaucrat is no longer a neutral agent in the decision-making process. 6 Indeed, PRO/AlR20/1913, for example, contains several tables in which Ministry of Aircraft Production officials had calculated figures equal to 85 per cent of the official programme which were then used internally to judge production performance, even though externally they bid for resources on the basis of the full programme.
The second modification of the Departmental Dilemma game relates to the fact that it is not necessarily true that the goal of the central allocators was to achieve the most efficient outcome possible. Indeed, reading the minutes of the various War Cabinet committees it soon becomes obvious that the central allocators were more interested in arriving at the 'best possible compromise' situation. They realised that to achieve the most efficient outcome required an amount of time and a degree of statistical, production and strategic knowledge which was simply not available to them.
Finally, the game as outlined above is based on rules of conflict, ignoring the role of cooperation. In practice, however, cooperation was especially important at what can be called the micro-level of relations between departments and committees. At this level officials were able to develop informal contacts which facilitated a freer movement of information. Thus, even where departmental heads were in conflict, information flows occurred at the micro-level and so enabled the system to achieve outcomes that were more efficient than it would otherwise have been possible to achieve.
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To examine the operation of the economy in this period, to evaluate the process of allocating scarce resources, it is therefore necessary to understand the organisation of the central bureaucracy and in particular to understand the interaction and relationship between different departments and between departments and the central allocating bodies. are not exhaustive -they merely represent the main channel of decision-making with regards to war production. In reality there were links between most of the different components shown, in particular there were strong links between the service departments and their sister supply departments (the Ministry of Aircraft Production, the Ministry of Supply and the production arm of the Admiralty).
The decision-making process was split into two spheres: the Production Sphere and the Strategic Sphere (I am primarily interested in the munitions programmes and have therefore ignored the civilian economy; however, it would be fairly easy to take this sector into account by simply adding a third, civilian, sphere). In the Strategic Sphere the military decisions which affected production were taken; in the Production Sphere, the production programmes were formulated and implemented so as to meet the military needs. There were three stages to the decision-making process: first, the strategic priorities were decided upon; these were then converted into Control Figures Supply departments are the Admiralty, the Ministry of Aircraft Production and the Ministry of Supply.
Information from the theatres of war was gathered by each of the service departments and was used by them to develop their medium term strategic plan (in terms of the munitions they would require). Each department then presented its case at a meeting of the Chiefs-of-Staff Committee. 9 This body met daily during the war to discuss the military situation but it rarely debated anything in depth -its purpose was to accept (and therefore refer to a higher authority), considerations demand that light tanks, bomber aircraft, and escort ships must be available to fight the enemy successfully then that is what the munitions industries must produce. The superiority of strategy over production could be seen by the fact that the decisions taken in the Strategic Sphere were self-contained in a way which those in the Production Sphere were not. The supply ministers were not represented on the coordinating committees in the Strategic Sphere (they could say nothing to influence strategic policy because they lacked the relevant information); the service ministers, on the other hand, were represented on the coordinating committees in the Production Sphere (they influenced production policy because it was geared, primarily, to meeting their requirements). Although the Production Sphere could affect strategy (for example, by failing to deliver a particular weapon at a particular time) it did not do so as an ex ante constraint.
III
The important role of information and knowledge can be gauged by the fact that At the top of the hierarchy, the authorities realised it was important that the many and varied information flows that occurred in the economy were coordinated properly and that there was independent advice available. Thus, they developed their own statistical and economic bodies and advisers; the most important of these were the Central Statistical Office, the Economic Section and the Prime Minister's Statistical Section, all of which utilised the abilities of academic economists and statisticians drafted into the system as temporary civil servants.
The Central Statistical Office and the Economic Section were vital parts of the Cabinet infrastructure. Given the importance of statistical information in the wartime economy it was vital that the War Cabinet could call on a neutral body to collect, collate and produce statistics. The Central Statistical Office was such a body: it was not allowed to make any comments on the statistics it produced other than technical comments. 22 When there was a serious interdepartmental dispute its duty to provide "neutral" data which would allow the dispute to be settled.
Neutral economic advice was provided by the Economic Section which was staffed This strong advocate role naturally aroused hostility in the departments being scrutinised as it was yet another layer of information filtering which many felt was unnecessary. Many civil servants, including some of those economists who worked as temporary civil servants, felt that although the Section could be constructive it was often destructive, causing them to run around for days examining ideas put into Churchill's head by the Section that they, the civil servants, knew from the beginning were not implementable.
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The Section probably also contributed to inefficiency in the central administration Harrod, op. cit., departments and between departments and the central allocators (in terms of figure one these features were encouraging a move towards postion a).
From figure two it can be seen that the organisational structure of the decisionmaking process was clearly defined, with a strict hierarchial nature. This was important because it meant that a decision taken at any level of the system could be communicated to all other levels quickly and effectively. In most cases there was also no dispute about the relative authority of any committee or other body in the system -where there were disputes they were normally settled quickly and the relationship between the disputers defined so as to avoid further conflict (although this is not to argue that administrative bottlenecks did not occur).
However, flexibility was also built into the system by using ad hoc committees to deal with situations which the formal structure found difficult to accommodate.
The best example of the importance of these informal mechanisms was a series against it in interdepartmental argument, and wished to guard against premature action being taken by the other on schemes which were still under debate; however, as officials got to know each other the flow of information gathered pace, albeit unofficially.029
In other words, as time passed the unofficial links grew in strength; even though there were occasional squabbles at the Ministerial level, at lower levels the relations of the two departments improved progressively.
IV
There are two reasons why the conclusions of the official historians with regards to wartime resource allocation by Whitehall should be re-examined: firstly, there is the obvious fact that most of the volumes are now thirty or more years old; a stronger reason is that their analysis of the inherent economic relationships that underlay the process of wartime resource allocation tend to be rooted in anecdotal stories rather than in an objective framework. Given that the economic analysis of bureaucracy and central economic management has evolved much in the last two decades it is now possible to make the analysis of those underlying 31 Postan, op. cit..
